Bot detection using machine learning (ML), with network flow-level features, has been extensively studied in the literature. However, existing flow-based approaches typically incur a high computational overhead and do not completely capture the network communication patterns, which can expose additional aspects of malicious hosts. Recently, bot detection systems that leverage communication graph analysis using ML have gained attention to overcome these limitations. A graph-based approach is rather intuitive, as graphs are true representation of network communications. In this paper, we propose BotChase, a twophased graph-based bot detection system that leverages both unsupervised and supervised ML. The first phase prunes presumable benign hosts, while the second phase achieves bot detection with high precision. Our prototype implementation of BotChase detects multiple types of bots and exhibits robustness to zero-day attacks. It also accommodates different network topologies and is suitable for large-scale data. Compared to the state-of-theart, BotChase outperforms an end-to-end system that employs flow-based features and performs particularly well in an online setting.
channels.
A malevolent adversary controls the bots through botmaster, which could be distributed across several agents that reside within or outside the network. Hence, bots can be used for tasks ranging from distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), to massive-scale spamming, to fraud and identify theft. While bots thrive for different sinister purposes, they exhibit a similar behavioral pattern when studied up-close. The intrusion kill-chain [2] dictates the general phases a malicious agent goes through in-order to reach and infest its target.
Anomaly-based methods are widely used in bot detection [3] , [4] . They first establish a baseline of normal behavior for the protected system and model a decision engine. The decision engine determines and alerts any divergence or statistical deviations from the norm as a threat. Machine learning (ML) [3] is an ideal technique to automatically capture the normal behavior of a system. The use of ML has boosted the scalability and accuracy of anomaly-based IDSs [4] . The most widely employed learning paradigms in ML include supervised and unsupervised. Supervised learning uses labeled training datasets to create models. It is employed to learn and identify patterns in the known training data. However, labeling is non-trivial and typically require domain experts to manually label the datasets [3] . This can be cumbersome and prone to error, even for small datasets. On the other hand, unsupervised learning uses unlabeled training datasets to create models that can discriminate between patterns in the data.
An important step prior to learning, or training a ML model, is feature extraction. These features act as discriminators for learning and inference, reduce data dimensionality, and increase the accuracy of ML models. The most commonly employed features in bot detection are flow-based (e.g., source and destination IPs, protocol, number of packets sent and/or received, etc). However, these features do not capture the topological structure of the communication graph, which can expose additional aspects of malicious hosts. In addition, flow-level models can incur a high computational overhead, and can also be evaded by tweaking behavioral characteristics e.g., by changing packet structure [5] .
Graph-based features, derived from flow-level information, which reflect the true structure of communications, interactions, and behavior of hosts, are an alternate that overcome these limitations. We show that incorporating graph-based features into ML yields robustness against complex communication patterns and unknown attacks. Moreover, it allows for cross-network ML model training and inference. The major contributions of this paper are as follows. • We propose BotChase, an anomaly-based bot detection system that is protocol agnostic, robust to zero-day attacks, and suitable for large datasets. • We employ a two-phased ML approach that leverages both supervised and unsupervised learning. The first phase filters presumable benign hosts. This is followed by the second phase on the pruned hosts, to achieve bot detection with high precision. • We propose feature normalization (F-Norm) on top of graph-based features in BotChase and evaluate various ML techniques. Our graph-based features, inspired from the literature and derived from network flows, undergo F-Norm to overcome severe topological effects. These effects can skew bot behavior in different networks, exacerbating ML prediction. Furthermore, these features allow to combine data from different networks and promote spatial stability [6] in the ML models. • We compare the performance of our graph-based features with flow-based features from BotMiner [7] and BClus [8] in a prototype implementation of BotChase. Furthermore, we compare BotChase with BotGM [9] and the end-to-end system proposed for BClus. • We evaluate the BotChase prototype system in an online setting that recurrently trains and tests the ML models with new data. We also leverage the Hoeffding Adaptive Tree (HAT) [10] classifier for incremental learning. This is crucial to account for changes in network traffic and host behavior. This paper is an extension of our preliminary work in [11] . The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present a background on bot detection, highlight limitations of the state-of-the-art and motivate the problem. Our system design is delineated in Section III. We evaluate the BotChase prototype in Section IV. In Section V, we conclude with a summary of our contributions and instigate future directions.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Botnet detection has been an active area of research that has generated a substantial body of work. Common botnet detection approaches are passive. They assume successful intrusions and focus on identifying infected hosts (bots) or detecting C2 communications, by analyzing system logs and network data, using signature-or anomaly-based techniques. Signature-based techniques have commonly been used to detect pre-computed hashes of existing malware in hosts and/or network traffic. They are also used to isolate IRC-based bots by detecting bot-like IRC nicknames [12] , and to identify C2-related DNS requests by detecting C2-like domain names [13] .
Metadata such as regular expressions based on packet content and target IP occurrence tuples [14] is an example of what could be employed in a signature and pattern detection algorithm. More generally, signature-based techniques have been employed to identify C2 by comparison with known C2 communication patterns extracted from observed C2 traffic, and infected hosts by comparison with static profiles and behaviours of known bots [15] . However, they can be easily subverted by unknown or modified threats, such as zero-day attacks and polymorphism [15] , [16] . This undermines their suitability to detect sophisticated modern botnets.
On the other hand, anomaly-based techniques use heuristics to associate certain behaviour and/or statistical features extracted from system or network logs, with bots and/or C2 traffic. C2 occurs at the early stages of a botnet's lifecycle, thus its detection is deemed essential to prevent malicious activities. Most existing anomaly-based C2 detection techniques are based on the statistical features of packets and flows [7] , [12] , [17] - [27] . Works like [17] , [18] are focused on specific communication protocols, such as IRC, providing narrow-scoped solutions. Whereas, BotMiner [7] is a protocol-independent solution, which assumes that bots within the same botnet are characterized by similar malicious activities and communication patterns. This assumption is an over simplification, since botnets often randomize topologies [15] and communication patterns as we observe in newer malwares, such as Mirai [28] .
Other works, such as [23] , [27] , leverage ML and trafficbased statistical features, for detecting C2 with low error rates. However, such techniques require that all flows are compared against each other to detect C2 traffic, which incurs a high computational overhead. In addition, they are unreliable, as they can be evaded with encryption and by tweaking flow characteristics [5] . Therefore, it is evident that a non-protocolspecific, more efficient, and less evadable detection method is desired.
Anomaly-based bot detection solutions that do not focus on detecting C2 per se, but rather identify bots by observing and analyzing their activities and behaviour, address some of the aforementioned issues. Graph-based approaches, where host network activities are represented by communication graphs, extracted from network flows and host-to-host communication patterns, have been proposed in this regard [5] , [9] , [29] - [40] . Le et al. [37] present a strong case for leveraging Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) in the context of bot detection with recall rates beyond 90%. However, SOM remains an unsupervised learning algorithm that ultimately requires manual expertise to distinguish unknown network traffic.
BotGM [9] builds host-to-host communication graphs from observed network flows, to capture communication patterns between hosts. A statistical technique, the inter-quartile method, is then used for outlier detection. Their results exhibit moderate accuracy with low false positives (FPs) based on different windowing parameters. However, BotGM generates multiple graphs for every single host. That is, for every pair of unique IPs, a graph is constructed, such that every node in the graph represents a unique 2-tuple of source and destination ports, with edges signifying the time sequence of communication. However, this entails a high overhead.
Khanchi et al. [41] propose botnet detection on nonstationary stream of data using incremental non-overlapping window. They propose to use a team of genetic programs to predict on records in a stream of data. These records are archived to build a data subset to further train the classifier. The true labels of the records are requested from human operators as long as the label budget is met. However, if records from minor classes are targeted for true label queries, minor classes are promoted aggressively, reducing the performance of major classes.
Chowdhury et al. [39] use ML for clustering the nodes in a graph, with a focus on dimensionality and topological characterization. Their assumption is that most benign hosts will be grouped in the same cluster due to similar connection patterns, hence can be eliminated from further analysis. Such a crucial reduction in nodes effectively minimize detection overhead. However, their graph-based features are plagued by severe topological effects (see Section IV). They use statistical means and user-centric expert opinion to tag the remaining clusters as malicious or benign. However, leveraging expert opinion can be cumbersome, error prone and infeasible for large datasets. Recently, rule-based host clustering and classification [40] have been proposed, where pre-defined thresholds are used to discriminate between benign and suspicious hosts. Unfortunately, relying on static thresholds make the technique prone to evasion and less robust to ML-based outlier detection.
Big Data has received a lot of attention lately, which is also often paired with streaming. Employing ML in a streaming context [42] undoubtedly yields better result than batching. Keen statistical techniques, such as concept drifts and ADWIN windowing, help surmount the challenges facing classification in data streaming. However, retraining the ML model only when a concept drift occurs may require specific threshold tuning, which does not generalize.
Graph-based approaches using ML for bot detection are intuitive and show promising results. In this paper, we propose BotChase, an anomaly-, graph-based bot detection system, which is protocol agnostic, i.e., it detects bots regardless of the protocol. BotChase employs graph-based features in a twophased ML approach, which is robust to zero-day attacks, spatially stable, and suitable for large datasets.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
The BotChase system consists of three major components, as depicted in Fig. 1 . These components pertain to data preparation and feature extraction, model training, and inference. In the following, we discuss these components.
A. Dataset Bootstrap 1) Flow Ingestion:
The input to the system are bidirectional network flows. These flows carry the basic IP layer information required to forward packets from one network node to another. By applying reduction on these flows, we create a set T that contains 4-tuple flows t i = (sip i , srcpkts i , dip i , dstpkts i ). sip i is the source IP address that uniquely identifies a source host, srcpkts i quantifies the number of data packets from sip i to dip i , the destination host IP address. The number of destination packets, dstpkts i , is the number of data packets from dip i to sip i .
Set A is a set of tuples that have exclusive source and destination hosts. That is, if multiple tuples have the same source and destination hosts, they are reduced to form an aggregated exclusive tuple a x ∈ A, such that a x = (sip x , srcpkts x , dip x , dstpkts x ). Therefore, if two tuples t i , t j ∈ T have the same source and destination hosts, i.e., 
2) Graph Transform: The system creates a graph G(V, E), where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of directed edges e i,j from node v i to node v j with weight |e i,j |. The set of nodes V is a union of hosts from set A, such that
For every a x ∈ A, there exists directed edges e i,j and e j ,i from v i to v j and v j to v i , respectively, such that sip x = v i and dip x = v j . Therefore,
The weights |e i,j | and |e j ,i | of edges e i,j and e j ,i are srcpkts x and dstpkts x , respectively. Moreover, if there exists a reverse tuple a y ∈ A | dip y = v i , sip y = v j , then |e i,j | = srcpkts x + dstpkts y and |e j ,i | = dstpkts x + srcpkts y .
3) Feature Extraction: BotChase creates the required graph-based feature set for the ML models. Features are intrinsic to the success of ML models that should represent and discriminate host behavior, especially bot behavior. We leverage the following commonly used graph-based features.
• In-Degree (ID) and Out-Degree (OD)-The in-degree, f i,0 , and out-degree, f i,1 , of a node v i ∈ V are the number of its ingress and egress edges, respectively.
These features play an important role in the network behavior of a host. Though, a higher ID for a host makes it a point of interest, it is often the case that nodes with a high ID offer a commonly demanded service. Therefore, observing ID alone may not signify malicious activity. For example, a gateway is a central point of communication in a network, but it is not necessarily a malicious endpoint. Intuitively, bots attempting to infect the network will tend to have a higher ID than benign hosts. Similarly, OD is also an intrinsic feature. Typically, in the reconnaissance stage of the intrusion kill-chain, bots attempt to survey the network. This mass surveillance can be captured via the OD. • In-Degree Weight (IDW) and Out-Degree Weight (ODW)-These features augment the ID and OD of the nodes in the graph. The in-degree weight, f i,2 , and the out-degree weight, f i,3 , of a node v i ∈ V is the sum of all the weights of its incoming and outgoing edges, respectively.
For a fine-grained differentiation, it is important to expose features that will eventually bring bots closer to each other, and discriminate bots from hosts. IDW and ODW features add another layer of information, further alienating the malicious hosts from the benign. Similar to ID, mass-data leeching bots will tend to expose a high IDW in the action phase of the intrusion kill-chain. Similarly, the ODW is the aggregate data packets a node has sent, which can potentially expose bots that mass-send payloads to hosts in a network. • Betweenness Centrality (BC)-The betweenness centrality of a node v i ∈ V , inspired from social network analysis, is a measure of the number of shortest paths that pass through it, such that
where σ v j v k is the total number of shortest paths between
is the number of shortest paths that pass through v i . This feature has a high computational overhead with O(|V |.|E | + |V | 2 . log |V |) time complexity [43] . However, it can alienate bots early on as they attempt their first connections. This is when the bots exhibit low IDW and ODW. Thus, it would be more favorable for the shortest paths in the network to pass through the host. Likewise, when the IDW and ODW increase, the BC of a node decreases immensely, as it is less favored for being included in shortest paths. • Local Clustering Coefficient (LCC)-Unlike BC, local clustering coefficient has a lower computational overhead, and it quantifies the neighborhood connectivity of a node v i ∈ V , such that
LCC feature can play an important role in discriminating malicious host's behavior. Successfully infected hosts tend to exhibit a higher LCC, as bots often deploy collaborative P2P techniques, making its adjacent host pairs strongly connected. • Alpha Centrality (AC)-Alpha centrality, also inspired from social network analysis, is a feature that generalizes the centrality of a node v i ∈ V . AC extends the Eigenvector centrality (EC), with the addition that nodes are also influenced by external sources. These external sources can be user-defined, according to their graphical analysis technique. In EC, each v i is assigned an influence score x i , that is iteratively exchanged with adjacent nodes. In essence, EC is the relative weight of a node in the graph, such that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of v i . Hence, AC is given as
where A i is the adjacency matrix, e i is the external influence of node v i , and α is influence factor that controls focus between external sources to internal influence. AC is important for the intermediate and terminal phases of the intrusion kill-chain. Early on, it may be negligible. However, as time progresses and bots perform more actions in the network, their AC will gradually increase, making it discriminative.
4) Feature Normalization (F-Norm):
Topological alterations can severely affect the host's behavior and pattern of communication in the graph. For example, in Fig. 2 , g acts as a gateway for host h2 to communicate with the rest of the network (i.e., hosts h3, h4 and h5). In this configuration, h 2 carries an ID of 2. In contrast, Fig. 3 shows the topology without a gateway, where h 2 communicates with other hosts in the network individually. This boosts the ID of host h 2 to 4. To alleviate this adverse effect of different network topologies, we normalize the above base features to include neighborhood relativity. To control the overhead of computing these normalized features, the neighborhood set N i for v i ∈ V is restricted to a certain depth D. The mean of j features for v i across its neighbors v k ∈ N i are computed. Each feature for v i is then normalized by incorporating neighborhood relativity. Thus, features relative to their neighborhood mean is given as
After normalizing the features (with D = 2) for h 2 and h 4 with gateway, their IDs change from 2 to 0.8 and 3 to 1.1, respectively. Without the gateway, their IDs change from 4 to 1.6 and 3 to 1.1, respectively. As aforementioned, normalization attempts to make hosts of the same nature look similar, making the topological alterations less severe. Similarly, in situations where network data is recorded over varying time intervals, IDW and ODW tend to increase substantially with larger time intervals. By normalizing features, the effect of time also diminishes.
B. Model Training
The model accepts graph-based features as input and learns to distinguish between malicious and benign hosts. The two learning phases in BotChase are explained below.
1) Phase 1: The first ML phase performs unsupervised learning (UL) to cluster the hosts. Generally, benign hosts exhibit similar behavior that can be gauged by the graphbased features. These hosts exhibit resembling patterns in data, such as sending (OD/ODW) and receiving (ID/IDW) similar number of packets [39] . Since BC, LCC and AC are directly affected by these traits, their influence can be similar for all benign hosts. Therefore, maximizing the size of the "singleton" benign cluster is crucial.
This phase not only acts as a first filter for new hosts, but also significantly reduces the training data for the second phase. If a host is clustered into the benign cluster, then it is strictly benign. However, it is important to note that a malicious host can also be incorrectly clustered into a benign cluster, adversely affecting system performance. Therefore, though the system objective is to maximize the size of the benign cluster, it is essential to jointly minimize the number of bots that are co-located in this cluster.
Various UL techniques can be deployed in this phase. Some of these techniques include k-Means, Density-Based Spatial Clustering (DBScan) and SOM.
• k-Means-The k-Means clustering algorithm attempts to find an optimal assignment of nodes to k pre-determined clusters, such that the sum of the pairwise distance from the cluster mean is minimized. k-Means is static, it results in the same cluster composition for a given dataset across different runs of the algorithm, with the same number of clusters and iterations. Assume k is set to the cardinality of the label set. Idealistically, there should be a clean assignment of hosts to corresponding clusters.
However, in reality, some benign hosts exhibit an outlier behavior. For example, network nodes that host webservers and public APIs will depict a huge amount of data and connections, thus impacting ID, IDW, OD and ODW. Therefore, depending on the dataset, altering k may adversely affect clustering performance.
• Density-Based Spatial Clustering (DBScan)-Unlike k-
Means, DBScan does not require the parameter k, the pre-determined number of clusters. In contrast, it computes the clusters and assignment of nodes according to a rigid set of density-based rules. DBScan requires a pair of parameters: (i) p, the minimum number of points required to be assigned as core points, and (ii) e, the minimum distance required to detect points as neighbors. DBScan classifies points as core, edge or noise, where core points must have p points in their neighborhood with a distance less than e. Otherwise, if the point is reachable via e distance from at least one of the core points, it is considered an edge. The remaining points are considered noise and are not clustered. That is, points are not forcefully assigned to clusters as some points may just be noise. Therefore, DBScan is capable of detecting non-linearly separable clusters. • Self-Organizing Map (SOM)-A SOM is a special purpose artificial neural network that applies competitive learning instead of error-correction. It is frequently used for dimensionality reduction and clusters similar data. However, the notion of similarity in SOM is looser than that of k-Means and DBScan. In SOM, neurons are pushed towards the data points for a certain number of iterations. It uses the best matching unit to determine the winner neuron and updates its weights accordingly. Furthermore, SOMs also apply a learning radius that affects all the other neurons, when a close-by neuron is updated. The number of neurons also play an important role in clustering. Higher number of neurons result in dispersion of nodes away from a single cluster. Importantly, the same logic applies to k-Means, hence the classifier with the best assignment must be selected, according to the objectives outlined in this phase. 2) Phase 2: Phase 1 separates the dataset between nodes that are inside and outside the benign cluster. All the nodes, ideally small, that reside outside the benign cluster are input to Phase 2 for further classification. Optimally, all the bots should be outside the benign cluster, regardless of whether or not they are co-located in the same cluster. Depending on the amount of hosts outside the benign cluster, the supervised learning (SL) classifiers used in this phase will exhibit different results.
The primary objective in this phase is to maximize recall. Recall is a measure of how many bots are recalled correctly, i.e., do not go unnoticed. It is proportional to the number of true positives (TPs) and inversely proportional to false negatives (FNs). Various SL classifiers can be deployed in this phase to achieve this objective, such as logistic regression (LR), support vector machine (SVM), feed-forward neural network (FNN) and decision tree (DT).
• Logistic Regression (LR) and Support Vector Machine (SVM)-LR focuses on binary classification of its input, based on a sigmoid function. Input features are coupled with corresponding weights and fed into the function. Once a threshold p is defined, usually 0.5 for the logistic function, it establishes the differentiator between positive and negative points. Unlike LR, SVM is a nonprobabilistic model for classification. It is not restricted to linearly separable datasets. There are various methods of computing SVM, including the renowned gradientdescent algorithm. • Feed-forward Neural Network (FNN)-FNNs are artificial neural networks that do not contain any cyclic dependencies. For a given feed-forward network with multiple layers, a feature vector is dispersed into the input layer, fed to the hidden layer of the network, and then to its output layer. While the input layer is constrained by the number of features exposed, the hidden and output layers are not. Every neuron may rely on a separate activation function that shapes the output. Popular activation functions for FNNs include identity, sigmoid, ReLU and binary step, among others. FNNs and the previously mentioned SL techniques are online classifiers. An online classifier is capable of incremental learning, as the weights associated with the deployed perceptrons are not static. This makes FNNs an attractive candidate for production-grade deployment. • Decision Tree (DT)-DTs rely heavily on information entropy (IE) and gain to conjure its conditional routing procedure. Generally, IE states how many bits are needed to represent certain stochastic information in the dataset. By using DT, information gain is maximized from the observed data and the taken path. After training a DT, newly observed data points can be predicted. However, unlike all the other classifiers, DTs are not online. That is, optimally retraining a DT must be done from scratch. Recall the objective from Phase 1, i.e., minimize hosts outside the benign cluster (HOB), while maximizing bots outside the benign cluster (BOB). This results in a minimal training dataset for Phase 2. Also, it is expected that the resultant training dataset from Phase 1 would be unbalanced, with a bias towards benign hosts. This may prove problematic for LR, SVM and FNN in achieving high recall rates.
C. Inference
Once the models are trained, they are deployed in the system to perform bot detection. Ideally, the system must allow for two modes of execution: (i) model (re)training, to adjust to the dynamics of the network, and (ii) inference, i.e., for a given host predict whether or not it is a bot. In BotChase, the inference unfolds in two steps-presumable benign hosts get filtered out in Phase 1 as they get assigned to the benign cluster, while suspicious hosts that are assigned to a different cluster are further classified in Phase 2. Fig. 4 captures the inner workings of host classification. For consistency, the system must execute requests in order of observation.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We implement and evaluate the BotChase prototype bot detection system on a Hadoop cluster. In this section, we detail the experimental setup and the results of our evaluation.
A. Environment Setup 1) Hardware: The Hadoop cluster consists of a management node (2×Intel Xeon Silver 4114, 192 GB RAM), a compute node (2×Intel Xeon Gold 5120, 384 GB RAM) and four data nodes (2×Intel Xeon Silver 4114, 192 GB RAM). A 25Gbit and 10Gbit physical networks are deployed, interconnecting the nodes. The former network is primarily used for data and applications, while the latter is for administration.
2) Software: The software implementation is primarily based on Java. To ease dependency management, we incorporate Gradle [44] . JGraphT [45] graph library is used to construct the graph and extract graph-based features from network flows. Both Smile [46] and Encog [47] are used in tandem for ML. In order to support rapid prototyping, a custom in-house DataFrame (DF) library has been developed. DF conforms to the incremental streaming paradigms, data streams with well-defined source, pipelines and sinks. Furthermore, the underlying data structures are immutable, and all the basic stream-based transformations are available.
B. Dataset
The evaluation of BotChase is based on the CTU-13 [8] dataset. CTU-13 comprises of 13 different subset datasets (DS) that include captures from 7 distinct malware, performing port scanning, DDoS, click fraud, spamming, etc Every subset carries a unique network topology with a certain number of bots that leverage different protocols. CTU-13 labels indicate whether a flow is from/to botnet, background or benign. Known infected hosts are labeled as bots, while remaining hosts are tagged as benign. We leverage 12 datasets as base training data, while a single dataset, #9, is left out for testing purpose. This test dataset contains NetFlow data collected from a Neris botnet, 10 unique hosts labeled as bots, performing multiple actions including spamming, click fraud, and port scanning. We use this dataset configuration for training and testing, unless stated otherwise. Table I highlights the graph creation time, i.e., graph transform (GT), number of graph nodes (|V|), total runtime to extract only base BC feature and all base features (FE), and total runtime to normalize features (i.e., F-Norm).
It is evident that there is a non-linear relationship between BC and the number of nodes in the graph. BC alone consumes a large portion of the FE time. Furthermore, the inconsistent variation between GT and the number of nodes is due to the differing time windows across datasets. Also, dataset #3 has a much higher number of flows than #2, which increases the runtime of graph creation. This is primarily due to the repeated modification of exclusive flow tuples in set A. The system then normalizes the base features, and Table I depicts its total runtime with D = 1. Evidently, normalizing does not significantly increase the total runtime of the system, with 13.755 seconds for the most complex dataset.
We highlighted the limitations of a stand-alone supervised learning approach in [11] . Based on our evaluations, LR outperforms DT in precision, while DT shows a superior training time and robustness to unknown attacks. However, precision, training time and robustness are all crucial for our bot detection system. Can we achieve the best of all three? To investigate this, we set out to evaluate a two-phased system that employs an initial clustering phase (i.e., UL), followed by a classification phase (i.e., SL).
2) Phase 1 (UL): For the first ML phase in BotChase, we evaluate three UL techniques, namely k-Means, DBScan and SOM. However, DBScan results are inconclusive, where bots are co-located with benign hosts. DBScan is evaluated with varying minimum number of neighborhood points (minPts) and distance ( ). Multiple values are tested in the range of [10 −5 , 10 −4 , . . . , 10 5 ]. Also, we infer values that correspond to the boundary of the bots themselves. We vary minPts in [1, 2,. . . , 25] depending on the number of bots in the aggregated training dataset. However, maximal separation of bots from benign hosts could not be achieved with the tested parameters. In essence, DBScan does not produce a single, prevalent 3) Phase 2 (SL): Tables II and III highlight the evaluation metrics, including number of clusters or neurons, number of hosts outside the benign cluster (HOB), percentage of hosts outside the benign cluster relative to the total number of hosts (HOB%), number of bots outside the benign cluster (BOB), and percentage of bots relative to the total number of bots (BOB%). Recall, the dataset #9 is removed for testing, which includes 10 hosts labeled as bots and ≈366K hosts. Also, ≈3.2M hosts from the remaining datasets are used to train the classifiers. In comparison to the number of clusters for k-Means, SOM is able to alienate its first bot outside the benign cluster with a lower number of neurons (9 vs. 16). With 81 neurons, SOM has a recall of 92%, with k-Means achieving 42%. However, k-Means catches up with 121 clusters. Nevertheless, SOM outperforms k-Means by maximizing the number of bots isolated with a smaller number of neurons.
With a cluster size of 100, k-Means alienates 21 bots, while having an outside host sum of 3028 for the remaining nonbenign clusters. In contrast, SOM removes 23 bots from the benign cluster with an outside host sum of 3675. The very next k-Means cluster size, i.e., 121, boosts HOB from 3028 to 26935, while SOM remains at a close 3894. However, k-Means isolates three extra bots, yielding 24 BOB for 26935 HOB. That is, three extra bots were detected for a ≈23K increase in HOB. Recall that our objective in this phase is to jointly minimize HOB while maximizing BOB. Therefore, SOM with 100 neurons becomes the natural choice. With respect to runtime, k-Means mostly outperforms SOM, as depicted in Fig. 5 . With 100 clusters, k-Means took 16.8 seconds to train, in comparison to 47.1 seconds of SOM. We speculate that SOM's ever increasing training time is contributed to how it updates the surrounding neurons. As the number of neurons increase, the density of their neighborhood also increases. Eventually, more neurons will tend to be within the threshold radius. Nevertheless, with recall being our top priority, we leverage SOM as a UL classifier in Phase 1.
The training set for Phase 2 is determined by the number of hosts outside the benign cluster in Phase 1. These are the relevant hosts for this phase, as hosts that are assigned in the benign cluster never make it to Phase 2. With a 10×10 (i.e., 100 neurons) SOM and normalized features in Phase 1, the size of the dataset is significantly reduced. Therefore, we have 3675 HOB, including 23 bots, for further classification in Phase 2.
For this phase in BotChase, we evaluate four SL techniques, namely DT, LR, SVM and FNN. We use DT with Gini instance split rule algorithm, LR without regularization, and SVM with the Gaussian kernel and a soft margin penalty of 1. Moreover, NN is configured to use cross entropy as an error function and 10 hidden layers of 1000 units each. The DT classifier shows the best performance with the small dataset, as depicted in Table IV . It successfully detects all bots in the test dataset, with only a single FP out of the 366871 benign hosts. In contrast, all other classifiers are lackluster and unable to recall even a single bot from the dataset. We believe this is because all classifiers, except DT, rely on gradient-descent for errorcorrection. This implies that every single node in the dataset will affect the end-hypothesis function. Thus, with a dataset that is unbalanced, the hypothesis will be biased towards the benign hosts, which is the case for LR, SVM and FNN. Therefore, to balance the training dataset we follow a mixed sampling approach. The benign hosts are subject to downsampling to defined set size K in a range of [1K, 2K, 5K, 10K]. We then perform oversampling with replication for the bots at a 1:1 ratio with respect to the benign hosts. This provides a balance in between the dataset labels. The experiments are repeated per unique set size and the best overall outcome is then selected. Table VI shows the results with a balanced training dataset in this current scenario. SVM and FNN remain unfazed, not being able to classify a single bot. However, DT shows a significant drop in its classification performance. Since this is the pruned dataset, the number of unique data points present is minimal and the imbalance is not as significant as observed in [11] . However, balancing at this stage means balancing data points that were all outliers. This makes it more difficult for DT, which relies on information entropy, to converge to a proper bot classification state. As DT incurs a significantly less training time than LR, we proceed with the vanilla pruned dataset in the following analyses. 
4) Feature Normalization:
Recall that aggregating datasets from different networks can negatively impact the base features, thus compromising system performance. Essentially, the topological structure of different networks affect the extracted graphical features, greatly skewing bot pattern and behavior. Thus, the intuition behind feature normalization is to make hosts, including bots, from different datasets look alike. Table IX showcases the crucial depreciation of the SOM results without normalizing graph-based features. For example, with 81 neurons, SOM with and without F-Norm scores 92% and 60% on BOB, respectively. On average, the results without F-Norm have a higher HOB. This intrinsic observation signifies the lack of similarity between hosts of the same category. For example, benign hosts from different networks are not co-located due to the stark differences in their features. Conversely, with F-Norm, similarly labeled hosts are more frequently co-located, yielding better BOB and HOB. Hence, normalized graph-based features significantly improve the spatial stability of ML in BotChase.
For 100 neurons, SOM with F-Norm results in 23 BOB and 3675 HOB. Without F-Norm, it results in 22 BOB and 8465 HOB, as shown in Figures 6 and 7 . Thus, for the same number of neurons, feature normalization was able to maximize BOB, while minimizing HOB. Therefore, we choose 100 neurons with F-Norm as our primary configuration for SOM.
5) Feature Engineering:
It is important to gauge the significance and impact of the chosen graph-based features on bot detection. Albeit, different feature combinations may impact results, but are all features necessary? Table X shows the Pearson's feature correlation matrix for the normalized graphbased features. At a glance, we can determine that the first five features are highly correlated, with a correlation close to or greater than 0.9. Therefore, feature combinations that Table IV ). Also, LR now misclassifies two benign hosts as bots.
A weakness of the chosen features is the runtime of BC. For the first dataset, it took over 24 hours to compute BC. This will render any effort to expedite the learning process in vain. However, removing BC from the feature set adversely affects the performance of DT, but not for SOM, as depicted in Tables XIII and XIV. SOM without BC performs identical to the use of the entire feature set. On the other hand, DT's precision is affected by the removal of BC, but it performs better than the removal of IDW and ODW from the feature set. While the precision deteriorates, only 6 and 9 benign hosts are misclassified out of the ≈367K hosts with the removal of BC and IDW/ODW, respectively. This reinforces the correlation matrix, i.e., these features are the most correlated. Since recall and precision are sought after metrics in BotChase, it is important to include these features for training and testing classifiers.
6) Comparative Analysis: Given the modularity of BotChase, in-place substitution of modules is possible. For example, rather than having graph-based features, the system can leverage flow-based features, while maintaining the two-phased bot detection. Therefore, we first compare the performance of our graph-based features with flow-based features from BotMiner and BClus in BotChase. Furthermore, we compare BotChase with the end-to-end system proposed for BClus. Finally, we provide a rough comparison against BotGM. In essence, BotGM and BotChase classify different entities in a network. The former predicts upon graphs of hostto-host communication, while BotChase classifies hosts based on a time frame. For a fair comparison, we reselect the training and testing datasets. This conforms to the selection in [8] , where the test dataset contains multiple bot types and different network topologies. The dataset selection of these comparisons is depicted in Table XV. BotMiner aggregates flows based on their source IP, protocol, destination IP and its corresponding port. These aggregated flows, called C-Flows, are processed in time epoch BClus undertakes a similar clustering approach by grouping flows into instances. These instances are identified by unique source IPs in a certain time window. Each instance is represented using 7 features: (i) source IP address, (ii) number of distinct source ports, (iii) number of distinct destination ports, (iv) number of distinct destination IPs, (v) total number of flows, (vi) total number of bytes, and (vii) total number of packets. These instances are then clustered using Expectation Maximization (EM). More features are then extracted from the clusters themselves to label clusters. These include: (i) total number of instances, (ii) total number of flows, (iii) number of distinct source IP addresses, and (iv) the average and standard deviation amount of distinct source ports, distinct destination IPs, distinct destination ports, number of flows, number of bytes, and number of packets. Hence, every cluster exhibits 15 features, which are then used by JRip (RIPPER), a propositional rule learner. After training, JRip is capable of classifying each cluster as malicious or benign. Ground truth label of clusters is determined through a bot flow threshold that is varied to find the best JRip model.
BotGM uses graph-based outlier detection to detect suspicious flow patterns. It starts off with extracting events, i.e., converting flows into a key-value entry. The key represents the source and destination IPs, while the value represents the source and destination ports. Then a sequence is extracted that tracks the source and destination port variations of two unique IPs. A directed graph is extracted from these variations, with vertices representing a port 2-tuple. The aggregate graphs are then mined for outlier detection. BotGM uses the graph edit distance to gauge how different a graph is from another. The inter-quartile method is then used to detect outliers.
• BotMiner Flow-based vs. Graph-based Features-We start with the aforementioned flow-based features from BotMiner in BotChase. Table XVI showcases the outcome of classifying flows using BotMiner features, where only LR is able to detect a few malicious flows, misclassifying the majority of benign and malicious flows. To compare, we convert our host classification into flow classification in Table XVII . With a recall (RCL) of 0.02% and a precision (PRC) of 16.28%, BotMiner features perform poorly against the graph-based features. The latter scores 81.57% and 99.51% on recall and precision, respectively. However, in comparison to host classification (see Table XXI ), the precision is significantly higher as the flows originating from the identified FP hosts were relatively minimal. Likewise, the different number of flows per host may result in a lower or higher recall rate. While LR and DT highlight similar host classification results, DT is the more favorable flow classifier as it does not misclassify prominent benign hosts.
• BClus Flow-based vs. Graph-based Features-
Implementing BClus features in BotChase was an incremental process. Alongside choosing the optimal number of EM clusters, F-Norm has a major impact on the results. Unlike BotMiner, BClus strictly classifies instances pertaining to unique source IPs. An instance becomes a full representation of host behavior, using a large time window that fits the entire test dataset. As depicted in in a higher recall rate. We experimented with both of our two successful classifiers working in tandem, DT and LR.
The results in Table XXV reflect our hypothesis. The ensemble is able to correctly predict 13 bots, boosting recall to 92.86%. However, given the conservative approach, an FP incurred in any classifier will be accounted for. In this case, the classifiers on their own predict different hosts as FPs, resulting in an aggregate of 6 FPs. While this approach brings down the precision of the second phase to 68.52%, it enables us to successfully classify one more bot. 8) Analysis in an Online Setting: While our infrastructure fully supports streaming, our initial evaluation of BotChase was carried out on the entire CTU-13 dataset as a single data batch. However, it will be crucial to constantly retrain the ML models to account for change in network traffic patterns and host behavior. This will indeed be fundamental in realizing autonomic security management [48] . Most ML models are trained offline, and retrained from scratch. When this proves to be computationally intensive and time consuming, it prohibits the aspects of online deployment. The ability to retrain the model as new data becomes available, is fundamental to accommodate ML models' boundary changes after deployment.
To evaluate BotChase in an online setting, we iteratively retrain the ML models with new data and test the models. The training and testing datasets are inferred from Table XV . We assess the different ML models as we increase the amount of flows ingested into the system, from the aggregated training dataset. Therefore, a time window (w) of 5 minutes spawns N time windows, where N is the number of training sub-datasets. In the current dataset, a 5 minute time window is equivalent to 40 minutes of ingested data. Furthermore, the smallest training dataset has 15 minutes of flows, while the largest has 4011 minutes. This is due to the nature of network flows. For example, the number of flows captured in one minute of a DDoS attack will outweigh that of an idle network. Therefore, the percentage of flows ingested into the system will increase in a non-linear manner. Also, it is ideal for the time window to be smaller than the smallest dataset.
With w = 5 and the same aggregated test dataset to assess the different ML models, we expose the elapsed time (t), percentage of flows ingested online (Ing.), and the classification metrics in Table XXVI ingested, a bot behavior can become more prominent and anomalous to that of benign. However, with further flows, the bot may also be able to disguise itself as benign. Since BotChase depends on graph-based features, an additional flow either adds weight to an existing edge or creates one. This will effectively change the neighbouring malicious and benign host features used in training, thus skewing performance. Fig. 8 showcases the different training and testing times observed as the time window progresses. Since we are dealing with flows in this scenario, the training time incorporates the time needed to extract the features from the flows. This requires building the graph incrementally with the given flows and extracting the features of every node. The plot takes on a positive slope for the training time, while the testing time remains at a plateau of around 9 seconds. At 75 minutes, the training time jumps to 227 seconds, slightly incrementing to 244 seconds at 80 minutes. Even at this optimal mark, the training time remains < w. This implies that the system is ready for classification prior to the processing of the next window interval. Some variations in performance are observed beyond t = 100 minutes. This is because over-fitting can occur that contributes to additional FPs and FNs. The system reaches a steady state at t = 270 minutes, when only 37.22% of the flows are ingested. The sooner an online system becomes effective, the better. The amount of ingested flows and required training time dictates the total system overhead over time. The second phase supervised classifier used is DT, and it uses the ID3 algorithm [49] . This specific algorithm does not permit incremental learning, thus the tree is reinitialized at every epoch. Obviously, this is not efficient.
Therefore, we further experiment with a very fast decision tree (VFDT) variation, the HAT. This tree algorithm can be trained on-the-fly as new data becomes available. It maintains old branches, making sure to prune them as they become obsolete. An internal naïve bayes selector is used when the tree leaves have the same values but different labels. Using MoA's HAT [50] , we set out to experiment with BotChase using the Hoeffding algorithm. The results are depicted in Table XXVII .
We ran the algorithm with the same settings as that of the former experiment.
• At t = 5 mins, HAT should be very similar to ID3 as both trees have the same exact data. This is exposed with minimal flow ingestion, and zero recall and precision. • At t = 40 mins, 3.61% of flows are now ingested into the system. This is the first epoch at which the system attempts to positively label hosts. However, this results in 44 FPs. • At t = 55 mins, we reach 4.26% of ingested flows. At this point, the system is able to successfully detect 7 out of the 14 bots. Compared to ID3, the system maintains its momentum to converge to a state that is capable of detecting bots. While the number of FPs have decreased, 20 still remain. • At t = 70 mins, the system is able to successfully detect 2 more bots, incurring alot more FPs along the way. • At t = 90 mins, the model becomes capable of capturing most of the bots, misclassifying only one. The amount of flows ingested is now 13.53%, The model still incurs a few FPs, only 1 more FP than that of the former algorithm. • At t = 95 mins, the system reaches a steady state. The recall rate does not change, but the precision increases to 81.25%. Throughout this progression, SOM maintains an average training time of 4 seconds. Fig. 9 shows the stark difference in training time once an incremental classifier is deployed. Retraining from scratch results in an ever increasing training time. However, leveraging an incremental model allows the training time to only be restrained to new data. In general, HAT takes longer to achieve a good system state for detection, but will do so incrementally without retraining from scratch. There is a prominent compromise between convergence speed, training time, and efficacy of the model. When training time is paramount, one would favor HAT over ID3. Moreover, HAT seems more stable over time, as we see some dips in performance across intermediate iterations for ID3. With only ≈14% of the flows ingested and ≈2 minutes of training time incurred at every iteration, BotChase proves suitable for deployment in an online classification setting.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose BotChase, a system that is capable of efficiently transforming network flows into an aggregated graph model. It leverages two ML phases to differentiate bots from benign hosts. Using SOM, the first phase establishes an acceptable compromise between maximizing the benign cluster and alienating the malicious bots. Furthermore, the results of the second phase favor DT, showcasing high TPs and low FPs. Without F-Norm, the results of the SOM were exacerbated, isolating less bots and decreasing the size of the benign cluster.
BotChase is also able to detect bots that rely on different protocols, proves robust against unknown attacks and cross-network ML model training and inference. Flow-based features employed in BotChase under perform in comparison to graph-based features. BotChase also outperforms an endto-end system that employs flow-based features, and performs well against the graph-based BotGM system. In an online setting, BotChase leverages HAT for incremental learning to process data on-the-fly. While the model takes longer to converge, it exhibits superior classification performance in its final state. Further tuning the classifiers, exploring advanced ensemble learning and feature engineering, and extending F-Norm to higher degrees are candidates for future research.
